RECENT AMENDMENTS IN SECTION-377 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
Author : Nitesh Mahech
Volume 1 Issue 1
ISSN : 2581-8465
ABSTRACT
The struggle against section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is one of the historical significance in India. The 150-year-old law, which could impose as harsh a penalty as life imprisonment for violations, had been challenged by public interest litigation for a decade. The acceptance of the homosexual community and the development of laws regarding homosexuality has been a slow one and has started nearly two decades earlier. This research paper is concerned with the verdict of section 377 that has opened a window for the community to seek dignity in every sphere of life and the said dignity will lead to equality.
This research paper deals with the recent amendments of section-377[1] and the critical analysis of the landmark verdict of Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India as well as its comparison with the earlier judgments of Suresh Kumar Kaushal v. Naz Foundation and Naz Foundation v. Govt. Of NCT of Delhi along with various concerned reports and some other relevant case laws with respect to the LGBT Community. This paper includes the development of the social opinion regarding the homosexual community and their societal status. Following this, the paper concludes the impact of the verdict of section 377 of IPC with respect to LGBT Community in India.
INTRODUCTION
What is ‘Homosexuality’?
Homosexuality is a sexual orientation in which the person has the sexual attraction towards the same sex and those persons are commonly addressed as ‘gay’ or ‘lesbians’ in India. Further, LGBT community (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community) is a broader term which includes persons with diverse sexual preferences and was used to substitute gay in reference to the LGBT community beginning in the mid-to-late 1980’s[2].
The harassment and discrimination of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community in India resulting from the continued existence of Section 377[3] that has affected the rights of that community which are expressly guaranteed and are an epitome of the vision of the great leaders who wished to create a country adorned with a society which valued the virtues of equity, fairness and non-discrimination. That we continue to follow a provision which dates back to the 19th century in the 21st century wherein the rights of citizens have reached a zenith unparalleled before, it seems highly absurd to continue with a provision which contradicts everything which the constitution stands for.
Rights guaranteed under the Constitution, including but not confined to the right to equality, the right to non-discrimination, the right to privacy, the right to life and liberty, and the right to health, all of which are essential for the survival and well being of humans. As has been expressly held by the nine-judge constitutional bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the KS Puttaswamy[4] judgment that Article-21 is inclusive of and protects the right to privacy under the right to life and liberty guaranteed by the same[5].
As has been reiterated and reported by various reports including the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (in conjunction with the National Aids Control Organization) which has presented evidence and averred time and again that the continued existence of Section-377 is counter-productive to the efforts of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment. It renders a large number of people susceptible to high-risk categories in relation to HIV/AIDS, who reluctant to come forward for treatment due to a fear of law enforcement agencies, and that in driving homosexuality underground it increases risky behaviour such as unprotected sex.
History of the Legislation
The primary issue with the penal provision of section-377 is that it criminalizes sex other than penile-vaginal. It was prescribed at common law in England in the Fleta, 1290 and later in the Britton, 1300 that sodomites should be burnt alive. It was later on penalized under the Buggery Act of 1533 which was again re-enacted by Queen Elizabeth I in 1563 under which it became the charter for subsequent criminalization of sodomy in the British Colonies but in 1817, oral-genital sexual acts were removed from the definition of buggery act. And in 1861, death penalty was formally abolished in England and Wales.
Nonetheless, sodomy or buggery remained as a crime under Indian Penal Code under section 377 which reads as follows:
“377. Unnatural Offences—Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine[6].
Explanation—Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described in this section.”
This particular section provides for the acts which come under “unnatural offences” although the same text is not used in the section but used the expression “ carnal intercourse” which somehow different from the expression “sexual intercourse” used in the offences like rape. Subsequently, under Sexual Offences Act, 1967[7], English Law was reformed which decriminalized the act of sodomy above the age of 21 between consenting adults pursuant to the report of Wolfenden Committee which advising the Parliament to repeal laws penalizing homosexuality in 1957.
The ideology behind section-377 is settled by means of traditional, moral and ethical standards which confines the significance of sexual intercourse is for the purpose of procreation only which means non-procreation sexual activity is “against the order of nature” but it has no existence in our modern society. As criminalizing consensual same-sex conduct
taking place in private would serve as a weapon for police abuse, detaining and questioning, forced sex, harassment, extortion, the demand of hush money and significantly the discriminatory beliefs towards homosexuality. Therefore, the provisions of section-377 form a distinct category of vulnerable people in our society who are constantly affected and victimized.
Violation of Articles 14, 15 and 19 of the Constitution of India
The legislative objective under the provisions of section-377 has no rational nexus between the sexual conduct for both procreation and non-procreation purpose thus violative of Article-14[8] since it is based upon the stereotypes which have no place in modern society which renders arbitrariness and unreasonableness. The mandate of Article 14 is that like should be treated alike and that unlike should be treated differently. As a matter of fact, all persons are not alike or equal in all respects. Application of the same laws uniformly to all of them will, therefore, be inconsistent with the principle of equality. What section 377 does is that it creates a virtual barrier of sorts between people who have heterogeneous sexual proclivity against those people having a different idea as to their sexual orientation.
As Bhagwati J stated that the equality and non-arbitrariness in Article-14 require the principle of reasonableness and the procedure contemplated by Article-21 must answer the test of reasonableness for conformity with Article-14. It must not be arbitrary and must be right, just and fair, otherwise, it would satisfy the requirement of Artice-21.
Moreover, the right to non-discrimination on the ground of sex in Article 15 should not be read restrictively but should include “sexual orientation”. The criminalisation of homosexual activity by Section 377 discriminates on the grounds of sexual orientation and is therefore contrary to the Constitutional guarantee of non-discrimination under Article 15. Also, Article-15 provides the term “sex” which is not confined to “gender” only but also includes “sexual orientation” and therefore, it is implied in the said fundamental rights against discrimination that equality must be based on sexual orientation.
Hence, penalizing the homosexual conduct by means of section-377 is discriminatory on the grounds of sexual orientation and thus, violative of Article 15 also. The provision is inconsistent with the basic freedom guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) (b) (c) & (d), in that, the ability of an individual to make a personal statement about one’s sexual preferences, association and free to move so as to engage in homosexual conduct is restricted.
Violation of Article 21 of the Constitution
Article 21 of the constitution states that no person shall be deprived of his life and liberty except according to “procedure established by law”. There has been an extensive judicial discussion on the meaning of ‘life’ in various legal precedents. The expression “life” does not only limited to the physical act of breathing but also includes the right to live with human dignity, right to livelihood, right to health, right to pollution-free air, etc. The right to life is the fundamental one without which no person can live as a human being since it is the only article which has the widest possible interpretation and covers every standard for worth living. The rights like shelter, nourishment and growth are covered under the canopy of Article 21 and therefore, the basic necessities and requirements are equally crucial for every person.
In the landmark case of Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh1[9], in which the Supreme Court quoted and held that:
“By the term “life” as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by amputation of an armoured leg or the pulling out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world.”
Moreover, in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration[10], the Supreme Court reiterated with the approval the above observations and held that the “right to life” included the right to lead a healthy life so as to enjoy all faculties of the human body in their prime conditions. It would even include the right to protection of a person’s tradition, culture, heritage and all that gives
meaning to a man’s life. It includes the right to live in peace, to sleep in peace and the right to repose and health.
Until the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[11], a rather narrow and constricted meaning was given to the guarantee embodied in Article 21. But in Maneka Gandhi, a seven-Judge Bench decision, P.N Bhagwati, J. (as his Lordship then was) held that the expression “personal liberty” in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and give additional protection under Article 19. Any law interfering with the personal liberty of a person must satisfy a triple test: (i) it must prescribe a procedure; (ii) the procedure must withstand a test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation; and (iii) it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14. Since none of the above is complied with, hence there is no doubt as for the fact that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code is violative of the fundamental rights prescribed under the part-III of the constitution.
Article 21:- Right to Privacy and Dignity
It has been reiterated by various decisions that the right to privacy and the right to dignity are inherent aspects of the right to life envisaged under Article 21. It is humbly contended that the provision in question is an affront to both these aspects which are an inherent part of article 21.
Right to Privacy
Under the interpretation of right to life and human dignity, right to privacy is the implied which is an essential requisite for every citizen for having an intimate personal sphere concerning the claim of dignity on consensual sexual relations in private. Further, one’s sexual relations and preferences are the most crucial under privacy since it falls within an individual’s personality and at the core of “private space”. Also, the basic fundamental right to life has a damaging impact on homosexual community as it not only perpetuates social stigma but jeopardizing HIV/AIDS prevention efforts and therefore, rendering gay men increasingly vulnerable to contracting HIV/AIDS
Dignity
An important element of living a worthwhile life is the omnipresence of dignity without which the rights guaranteed by Article 21 falls flat on its face. Various precedents have dealt with the concept of dignity and held that the same is essential and has a variety of facets.
In Shabnam v. Union of India[12], it stated in the following terms:
“This right to human dignity has many elements. First and foremost, human dignity is the dignity of each human being ‘as a human being’. Another element, which needs to be highlighted, in the context of the present case, is that human dignity is infringed if a person’s life, physical or mental welfare is alarmed. It is in this sense of torture, humiliation, forced labour, etc. all infringe on human dignity. It is in this context many rights of the accused derive from his dignity as a human being”
In M Nagaraj v. Union of India[13], it was held that dignity to be intrinsic and inseparable from human existence. Dignity, the Court held, is not something which is conferred and which can be taken away because it is inalienable:
“The rights, liberties and freedoms of the individual are not only to be protected against the State, but they should also be facilitated by it… It is the duty of the State not only to protect human dignity but to facilitate it by taking positive steps in that direction. No exact definition of human dignity exists. It refers to the intrinsic value of every human being, which is to be respected. It cannot be taken away. It cannot give. It simply is. Every human being has dignity by virtue of his existence…”
By denying the LGBTQ community an important aspect of their reality and existence perpetuated by a penalizing provision is a direct attack at their dignity which not only results in the community ostracizing such individuals and prosecuting them simply for their choices, denying the liberty to make choices just because a section of our society isn’t ready to accept a new paradigm change in relationships. Needless to say that the same is a scathing attack on the quality of life enjoyed by such individuals. Moreover, when a three-judge bench of this Hon’ble court decided to look into the constitutionality of section 377 despite the Suresh Kaushal[14] judgment is itself descriptive of the fact that there is indeed an issue which needs to be adjudicated at the earliest as the stakes involve the very veracity of the constitutional provisions inserted by our founding fathers with the premise that the same would serve as a protection against the excesses of the state and enable citizens to live their lives a manner they deem fit.
THE 2018 JUDGEMENT OF NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR CASE
Introduction
Navtej Singh Johar case is pathbreaking in its approach as it sets significant standards in jurisprudence, clarifies certain provisions and strengthens some of the pillars of our democracy.
On 6th September 2018, a five-judge bench i.e. Hon’ble Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Hon’ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.
F. Nariman and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Indu Malhotra of the Supreme Court pronounced judgment over the issue i.e. ‘constitutional validity of section 377’ in Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India[15] . The Hon’ble Apex Court held that penalising consensual homosexual activities is against the fundamental rights of a person and hence, is inconsistent with the Constitution of India. Therefore, the Apex Court decriminalised homosexual activities done with the consent of both the parties. Also, in the judgement, the Court concerned with the following aspects:-
1. Constitutional Morality
The purpose of the Constitution of India is to transform society, not to preserve the pre-existing values of the majority because the majority may be heterosexuals who prefers the sexual intercourse only between the opposite gender i.e., male and female that would be ‘social morality’ but to transform society, it is the ‘constitutional morality’ which must prevail.
2. The miniscule Minority
Due to a “minuscule fraction of the country population” that belonged to LGBTQ Community, the Apex Court has previously upheld section 377 of the IPC in Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation. Since the fundamentals rights are available to every person irrespective of their sexual orientation, it was said by Chief Justice Misra in Johar Case, that it is meaningless as how much the number of people asserting a fundamental right.
3. Unreasonable
Classification
The purpose of section 377 of IPC is to protect woman and children from being subjected to carnal intercourse did not bear a reasonable nexus with the classification of persons into those who have carnal intercourse against the order of nature and those who don’t. In this, it was held that where there is discrimination by the legislation on the ground of core trait of an individual person then it cannot be termed under the reasonable classification that is based on intelligible differential[16].
4. Manifest Arbitrariness
It was found by all the judges that section 377 was manifestly arbitrary[17] as even after the 2013 amendment to the IPC, it was only concerned with the sexual acts between heterosexuals. Further, this section does not distinguish sexual intercourse between consenting and non-consenting competent adults which imposes a stigma on the members of
LGBTQ Community as procreation is not the sole aim in sexual intercourse and the section itself discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.
5. Progressive
Interpretation of the Constitution
The Apex Court held in furtherance on the principle of progressive interpretation that the Constitution of India is a living and organic document which is capable of expansion with the change in needs, culture and the beliefs of the society, and hence, it is the duty of the courts to make progressive and pragmatic interpretation of the law in order to ensure equality and justice in the society. Furthermore, the court was also of the opinion that the rule of courts increases when there is a case of rights of minorities in order to ensure the supremacy of law.
Submissions of the Petitioner
1. In Navtej Johar case, it was submitted by the petitioners that being a homosexual, bisexual or having other sexual orientation is completely natural and reflective of the expression of choice and inclination on the consent of two persons.
2. It was contended that sexual orientation of every member of the LGBTQ Community is not a physical or mental illness but a natural variation of expression.
3. It was urged that attraction towards the same sex or opposite sex are both naturally same and normal but the difference is of the lesser ratio of same-sex attraction.
4. Homosexuals require more protection than the heterosexuals for the purpose to achieve their full potential and to live freely without any fear or apprehension likewise a recognition of ‘Protection of Woman from Domestic Violence Act, 2005’[18].
5. Moreover, it was submitted that the rights of the LGBTQ Community needs to be recognized and protected and sexual orientation is to be treated as an integral part of every individual’s identity.
6. It was contended that the section 377 IPC is based on a foreign ideology which denotes societal values of the Victorian era.
7. Further, it was contended that the Apex Court should protect constitutional morality over social morality.
8. It was also contended that it is not yet defined the expression “carnal intercourse” and hence, it is being used arbitrarily and making the object of this provision inconsistent with the basic fundamentals of the Constitution.
9. It was submitted that ‘sex’, under article 15 of the Constitution includes ‘sexual orientation’ as observed in the case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union Of India[19]. Further, a person can be prosecuted under section 376(c) to 376(e) for the sexual acts done with an opposite gender without their consent whereas, the same acts are penalized u/s 377 if done with a partner of the same gender.
10. Moreover, it was contended by the petitioners that the 172nd Law Commission Report
recommends deleting section 377 IPC.
11. The petitioners submitted that the right to life and liberty of a citizen is a fundamental right under article 21 of the Constitution, as observed by the Apex Court in Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P[20] and Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh[21] which are arbitrarily curbed by section 377 IPC.
12. Furthermore, the Apex Court also held that the reputation is protected by the constitution as it is individual’s personal security under the right to enjoyment of life and liberty.
13. Lastly, it was contended that the LGBTQ+ community is deprived of its basic rights such as health education, public recognition because of constant terror in their minds due to the presence of this provision.
Submission of the Respondents
1. It was submitted by the respondents that it would be violative of the principle of natural justice if no opportunity is given to Union of India where it is allowing any issue other than the constitutional validity of section 377 IPC.
2. It was further submitted by the respondents that various provisions of the Constitution granted reliefs to the said community with issues pertaining to gender identity and sexual orientation.
3. It was also contended that any other relief cannot be granted to them and such prayers are abusive of privacy and personal liberty by transgressing the idea of public morality and dignity.
4. The respondents contended that in homosexuals, the percentage of prevalence of AIDS is much more than heterosexuals and thus, right to privacy may not be extended in order to enable people to indulge in unnatural offences and thereby contact AIDS.
5. It was further contended that if section 377 IPC is declared unconstitutional, then the bulwark of social culture that is the family system will be in a maelstrom.
6. Furthermore, it was contended by the petitioners’ argument that, “the status of homosexuals has changed in various parts of other countries”. This contention must not be considered since the cultural, economic and political heritage of those countries is quite different from that of India.
7. The respondents also contended that section 377 IPC is also applied to forced penal, non-vaginal sexual intercourse between adults so if it is struck down, then it would render the victims complaining of forced acts under such provision remediless.
8. It was also submitted that if same-sex adults are excluded from section 377 IPC then it would make a married woman remediless under IPC against her bisexual husband and his consenting male partner.
9. Moreover, it was submitted that in Fazal Rab Choudhary v State of Bihar[22], it was held that the offences under section 377 IPC imply sexual perversity. Furthermore, this Hon’ble Court also held that there should not be identical transplantation of western ideologies into our country in the case of Jagmohan v. State of U.P[23]
10. The respondents also contended that the word ‘sexual orientation’ is alien to the Constitution of India, hence, if the word ‘sex’ is to be replaced with the word ‘sexual orientation’ under article 15, or a new term i.e. ‘sexual orientation’ is to be inserted under article 15, is a matter of Constitutional Amendment, which is the responsibility of the Legislature. Hence, Section 377 should not be considered to be in violation of Article 15 of the Constitution of India.
11. It was further contended that penetration into non-sexual parts of the body under the concept of against the order of nature does not discriminate as it is based on biological reality which can never be unconstitutional.
12. Furthermore, the respondent relied on the Apex Court’s decision in the Suresh Kumar Kaushal case[24], in which there is a presumption of the constitutionality of legislation and the court must adopt self-restraint and thereby refrain from giving birth to judicial
legislation and the legislative wisdom of the Parliament must be respected and it must be left to the Parliament to amend Section 377 IPC. Furthermore, in the case of Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal[25] the court was of the opinion that it should not re-write, recast or reframe the legislation for any good reason to which it has no power to legislate, and therefore, the courts cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there.
Critical Analysis of the Judgment
1. In the judgment, the ratio to the decision given by Justice R. F. Nariman, he quotes “The love that dare not speak its name” which describes that how the love exists between same-sex couples which were described by Lord Alfred Douglas, the lover of Oscar Wilde, in his poem two love, published in 1894 in Victorian England” but the same statement can fit duly in context to the cases of adultery or extramarital affairs, which is penalised under the law. Furthermore, in both these situations, both the offenders duly have the consent to the same but this does not make their act legitimate in the eyes of law. So, how does love between homosexuals make any difference? Furthermore, it is expected from the Hon’ble Court to keep aside the personal views and emotions and to interpret the law in its true sense.
2. In the above judgment, two cases were cited: National Legal Services Authority v. UOI[26] – in which it was construed that gender identity and sexual orientation of an individual are an integral part of article 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, the court also referred to the case of Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India[27] in which, the right to privacy was given a fundamental status under the ambit of Article 21 which enured in favour of all persons, as well as the right to make individual choices was found to be an integral part of a person’s way of living in which the state is ought not to interfere.
In context with the abovementioned cases, the term sexual orientation is an alien term and is nowhere mentioned under article 15 of the Constitution of India and if the Apex Court deems it fine to insert the same under the ambit of article 15 of the Constitution, then the court must recommend the same to the legislature, since the
Constitution has vested the power of amendments to the legislature and not to the Judiciary. The same was also duly contended by the respondents. It is further contended that the ambit, scope and limitations to the right to privacy, as mentioned in the case of Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union Of India is yet to be determined. Since the right to privacy is not an absolute right, sexual activities within the same sex must not be treated in the light of the right to privacy.
3. The status of homosexuality in different countries and views presented by different foreign courts form a part of the ratio of the judgement, however, the adoption of certain policies and theories in some foreign land must not be the sole purpose to determine the validity of certain legislation within the country. Moreover, the court also considered the 172nd Law Commission report which talks about deleting Section 377 IPC, it is to be noted that the 172nd Law Commission report, though, is of the belief of deleting section 377 IPC, it does not present the view of decriminalising same-gender Sex. Rather, it suggests serving each and every offense which is covered under the ambit of section 377 to be dealt with indigenous provisions.
4. Justice Nariman, in ratio to his judgment, states that in the context of India, fundamental right to privacy would include at least the following three aspects:
o “Privacy that involves the person i.e. when there is some invasion by the state, of a person’s rights related to his physical body.
o Informational Privacy that does not deal with a person’s body, but rather a person’s mind.
o The privacy of choice, which protects an individual’s autonomy over fundamental personal choices”
In light of the interpretation of privacy made by the Hon’ble justice Nariman, if all three principles are read together, it gives complete immunity to a citizen under the right to privacy. No limitations have been discussed by Justice Nariman, and if the interpretation of the right to privacy is done in the same way as interpreted by Justice Nariman, then, in that situation each and every law would stand to be an inconsistency with the Article 21 of the Constitution. Hence, it must be admitted that such interpretation of the right to privacy is incomplete and does not match the objective sought to be achieved under article 21 of the constitution of India.
5. The Hon’ble Court also highlights the principle of “right to self-determination and individual autonomy”. In this regard, Justice Chandrachud gives ration over this principle and is of the opinion that human dignity is intrinsic to preserving the sanctity of life. He believes that “life is truly sanctified when it is lived with dignity” he further states that, “there should be no antagonism between the sanctity of human life and its dignity as well as quality. The quality of life ensures the dignity of living and dignity is a bit a process in realizing the sanctity of life”. The same is true and acceptable but the principle of self-determination cannot be relied upon since a person may change his sanctity again and again over a period of time, in the absence of the actual procedure of self-determination, and such principle, without the presence of a codified procedure, can be used arbitrarily. Hence, this principle cannot be relied upon, until complete guidelines are given by the Legislature over this principle.
CONCLUSION
After a long decade of time when the rights of LGBTQ+ community has given due consideration after 158 years of implementation of IPC and in furtherance of the same, the judgment of Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India[28] was passed as on 6th September 2018, decriminalizing section 377 of the IPC. But apart from that, there are other perspectives like the laws relating to such community are not yet defined providing a hindrance to their life. Also, there is no proper awareness regarding homosexuality in society. Further, the legislation must pass an amendment to section 377, making it clear, and removing any sort of ambiguity to such provision. Also, the legislature must pass special legislation, which would deal in rights, duties and remedies available to the LGBTQ+ community. Therefore, the verdict has turned out to be an effective step towards securing the rights of LGBTQ+ community but requires a social change too in the society.
[1] Section-377, Indian Penal Code, 1860.
[2] Acronyms, Initialisms & Abbreviations Dictionary, Volume 1, Part 1.
Gale Research Co., 1985, ISSN 978-0-8103-0683-7. Factsheet five, Issues 32-36,
Mike Gunderloy, 1989.
[3] Indian Penal code, 1860
[4] Writ Petition (Civil) No 494 of 2012.
[5] Ibid
[6] Section-377, Indian Penal Code, 1860
[7] Sexual offences act,1967
[8] Article 14, Constitution of India
[9] 1964 SCR (1) 332
[10] 1980 SCR (2) 557
[11] (1978) 1 SCC 248
[12] (2015) 6 SCC 702
[13] Writ Petition (civil) 61 of 2002
[14] CIVIL APPEAL NO.10972 OF 2013
[15] Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India WP(Crl.)No.76/2016
[16] Malhotra J, paragraph 14.3, Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union
of India
[17] Misra CJ, paragraph 239; Nariman J, paragraph 82; Chandrachud J, paragraph
29; Malhotra J, paragraph 14.9 in Navtej
Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India
[18] Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755
[19] (2017) 10 SCC 1
[20]( 2013) 2 SCC 398
[21]( 2013) 10 SCC 591
[22] (1982) 3 SCC 9
[23] (1973) 1 SCC 20
[24] Suresh Kumar Kaushal v Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1
[25] (1992) SUPP (1) SCC 323
[26] (2014) 5 SCC 438
[27] (2017) 10 SCC 1
[28] (2017) 10 SCC 1
[29] WP(Crl.)No.76/2016
[1] Section-377, Indian Penal Code, 1860.
[2] Acronyms, Initialisms & Abbreviations Dictionary, Volume 1, Part 1. Gale Research Co., 1985, ISSN 978-0-8103-0683-7. Factsheet five, Issues 32-36, Mike Gunderloy, 1989.
[3] Indian Penal code, 1860
[4] Writ Petition (Civil) No 494 of 2012
[5] Ibid
[6] Section-377, Indian Penal Code, 1860
[7] Sexual offences act,1967
[8] Article 14, Constitution of India
[9] 1964 SCR (1) 332
[10]1980 SCR (2) 557
[11]( 1978) 1 SCC 248
[12] (2015) 6 SCC 702
[13] Writ Petition (civil) 61 of 2002
[14] CIVIL APPEAL NO.10972 OF 2013
[15] Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India WP(Crl.)No.76/2016
[16] Malhotra J, paragraph 14.3, Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India
[17] Misra CJ, paragraph 239; Nariman J, paragraph 82; Chandrachud J, paragraph 29; Malhotra J, paragraph 14.9 in Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India
[18] Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755
[19]( 2017) 10 SCC 1
[20] (2013) 2 SCC 398
[21] 2013) 10 SCC 591
[22] (1982) 3 SCC 9
[23] 1973) 1 SCC 20
[24] Suresh Kumar Kaushal v Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1
[25] (1992) SUPP (1) SCC 323
[26] (2014) 5 SCC 438
[27] (2017) 10 SCC 1
[28] WP(Crl.)No.76/2016