RECENT AMENDMENTS IN SECTION-377 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
Author : Nitesh Mahech
Volume 1 Issue 1
ISSN : 2581-8465
The struggle against section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is one of
the historical significance in India. The 150-year-old law, which could impose
as harsh a penalty as life imprisonment for violations, had been challenged by
public interest litigation for a decade. The acceptance of the homosexual
community and the development of laws regarding homosexuality has been a slow
one and has started nearly two decades earlier. This research paper is
concerned with the verdict of section 377 that has opened a window for the
community to seek dignity in every sphere of life and the said dignity will
lead to equality.
This research paper deals with the recent amendments of section-377
and the critical analysis of the landmark verdict of Navtej Singh Johar &
Ors. v. Union of India as well as its comparison with the earlier judgments of
Suresh Kumar Kaushal v. Naz Foundation and Naz Foundation v. Govt. Of NCT of
Delhi along with various concerned reports and some other relevant case laws
with respect to the LGBT Community. This paper includes the development of the
social opinion regarding the homosexual community and their societal status.
Following this, the paper concludes the impact of the verdict of section 377 of
IPC with respect to LGBT Community in India.
What is ‘Homosexuality’?
Homosexuality is a sexual orientation in which the person has the sexual
attraction towards the same sex and those persons are commonly addressed as
‘gay’ or ‘lesbians’ in India. Further, LGBT community (lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender community) is a broader term which includes persons with
diverse sexual preferences and was used to substitute gay in reference to the
LGBT community beginning in the mid-to-late 1980’s.
The harassment and discrimination of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender community in India resulting from the continued existence of
that has affected the rights of that community which are expressly guaranteed
and are an epitome of the vision of the great leaders who wished to create a
country adorned with a society which valued the virtues of equity, fairness and
non-discrimination. That we continue to follow a provision which dates back to
the 19th century in the 21st century wherein the rights of citizens have reached
a zenith unparalleled before, it seems highly absurd to continue with a
provision which contradicts everything which the constitution stands for.
Rights guaranteed under the Constitution, including but not confined to the
right to equality, the right to non-discrimination, the right to privacy, the
right to life and liberty, and the right to health, all of which are essential
for the survival and well being of humans. As has been expressly held by the
nine-judge constitutional bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the KS
judgment that Article-21 is inclusive of and protects the right to privacy
under the right to life and liberty guaranteed by the same.
As has been reiterated and reported by various reports including the
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (in conjunction with the National Aids
Control Organization) which has presented evidence and averred time and again
that the continued existence of Section-377 is counter-productive to the
efforts of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment. It renders a large number of
people susceptible to high-risk categories in relation to HIV/AIDS, who
reluctant to come forward for treatment due to a fear of law enforcement
agencies, and that in driving homosexuality underground it increases risky
behaviour such as unprotected sex.
History of the Legislation
The primary issue with the penal provision of section-377 is that it
criminalizes sex other than penile-vaginal. It was prescribed at common law in
England in the Fleta, 1290 and later in the Britton, 1300 that sodomites should
be burnt alive. It was later on penalized under the Buggery Act of 1533 which
was again re-enacted by Queen Elizabeth I in 1563 under which it became the
charter for subsequent criminalization of sodomy in the British Colonies but in
1817, oral-genital sexual acts were removed from the definition of buggery act.
And in 1861, death penalty was formally abolished in England and Wales.
Nonetheless, sodomy or buggery remained as a crime under Indian Penal Code
under section 377 which reads as follows:
“377. Unnatural Offences—Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against
the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation—Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse
necessary to the offence described in this section.”
This particular section provides for the acts which come under “unnatural
offences” although the same text is not used in the section but used the
expression “ carnal intercourse” which somehow different from the expression
“sexual intercourse” used in the offences like rape. Subsequently, under Sexual
Offences Act, 1967,
English Law was reformed which decriminalized the act of sodomy above the age
of 21 between consenting adults pursuant to the report of Wolfenden Committee
which advising the Parliament to repeal laws penalizing homosexuality in 1957.
The ideology behind section-377 is settled by means of traditional, moral
and ethical standards which confines the significance of sexual intercourse is
for the purpose of procreation only which means non-procreation sexual activity
is “against the order of nature” but it has no existence in our modern society.
As criminalizing consensual same-sex conduct
taking place in private would serve as a weapon for police abuse, detaining
and questioning, forced sex, harassment, extortion, the demand of hush money
and significantly the discriminatory beliefs towards homosexuality. Therefore,
the provisions of section-377 form a distinct category of vulnerable people in
our society who are constantly affected and victimized.
Violation of Articles 14, 15 and 19 of the Constitution of India
The legislative objective under the provisions of section-377 has no
rational nexus between the sexual conduct for both procreation and
non-procreation purpose thus violative of Article-14
since it is based upon the stereotypes which have no place in modern society
which renders arbitrariness and unreasonableness. The mandate of Article 14 is
that like should be treated alike and that unlike should be treated
differently. As a matter of fact, all persons are not alike or equal in all respects.
Application of the same laws uniformly to all of them will, therefore, be
inconsistent with the principle of equality. What section 377 does is that it
creates a virtual barrier of sorts between people who have heterogeneous sexual
proclivity against those people having a different idea as to their sexual
As Bhagwati J stated that the equality and non-arbitrariness in Article-14
require the principle of reasonableness and the procedure contemplated by
Article-21 must answer the test of reasonableness for conformity with
Article-14. It must not be arbitrary and must be right, just and fair,
otherwise, it would satisfy the requirement of Artice-21.
Moreover, the right to non-discrimination on the ground of sex in Article 15
should not be read restrictively but should include “sexual orientation”. The
criminalisation of homosexual activity by Section 377 discriminates on the
grounds of sexual orientation and is therefore contrary to the Constitutional
guarantee of non-discrimination under Article 15. Also, Article-15 provides the
term “sex” which is not confined to “gender” only but also includes “sexual
orientation” and therefore, it is implied in the said fundamental rights
against discrimination that equality must be based on sexual orientation.
Hence, penalizing the homosexual conduct by means of section-377 is
discriminatory on the grounds of sexual orientation and thus, violative of
Article 15 also. The provision is inconsistent with the basic freedom
guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) (b) (c) & (d), in that, the ability of
an individual to make a personal statement about one’s sexual preferences,
association and free to move so as to engage in homosexual conduct is
Violation of Article 21 of the Constitution
Article 21 of the constitution states that no person shall be deprived of
his life and liberty except according to “procedure established by law”. There
has been an extensive judicial discussion on the meaning of ‘life’ in various
legal precedents. The expression “life” does not only limited to the physical
act of breathing but also includes the right to live with human dignity, right
to livelihood, right to health, right to pollution-free air, etc. The right to
life is the fundamental one without which no person can live as a human being
since it is the only article which has the widest possible interpretation and
covers every standard for worth living. The rights like shelter, nourishment
and growth are covered under the canopy of Article 21 and therefore, the basic
necessities and requirements are equally crucial for every person.
In the landmark case of Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh1,
in which the Supreme Court quoted and held that:
“By the term “life” as here used something more is meant than mere animal
existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs
and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the
mutilation of the body by amputation of an armoured leg or the pulling out of
an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the
soul communicates with the outer world.”
Moreover, in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration,
the Supreme Court reiterated with the approval the above observations and held
that the “right to life” included the right to lead a healthy life so as to
enjoy all faculties of the human body in their prime conditions. It would even
include the right to protection of a person’s tradition, culture, heritage and
all that gives
meaning to a man’s life. It includes the right to live in peace, to sleep in
peace and the right to repose and health.
Until the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,
a rather narrow and constricted meaning was given to the guarantee embodied in
Article 21. But in Maneka Gandhi, a seven-Judge Bench decision, P.N Bhagwati,
J. (as his Lordship then was) held that the expression “personal liberty” in
Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which
go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised
to the status of distinct fundamental rights and give additional protection
under Article 19. Any law interfering with the personal liberty of a person
must satisfy a triple test: (i) it must prescribe a procedure; (ii) the
procedure must withstand a test of one or more of the fundamental rights
conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation; and
(iii) it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14. Since
none of the above is complied with, hence there is no doubt as for the fact
that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code is violative of the fundamental
rights prescribed under the part-III of the constitution.
Article 21:- Right to Privacy and Dignity
It has been reiterated by various decisions that the right to privacy and
the right to dignity are inherent aspects of the right to life envisaged under
Article 21. It is humbly contended that the provision in question is an affront
to both these aspects which are an inherent part of article 21.
Right to Privacy
Under the interpretation of right to life and human dignity, right to
privacy is the implied which is an essential requisite for every citizen for
having an intimate personal sphere concerning the claim of dignity on
consensual sexual relations in private. Further, one’s sexual relations and
preferences are the most crucial under privacy since it falls within an
individual’s personality and at the core of “private space”. Also, the basic
fundamental right to life has a damaging impact on homosexual community as it
not only perpetuates social stigma but jeopardizing HIV/AIDS prevention efforts
and therefore, rendering gay men increasingly vulnerable to contracting
An important element of living a worthwhile life is the omnipresence of
dignity without which the rights guaranteed by Article 21 falls flat on its
face. Various precedents have dealt with the concept of dignity and held that
the same is essential and has a variety of facets.
In Shabnam v. Union of India,
it stated in the following terms:
“This right to human dignity has many elements. First and foremost, human
dignity is the dignity of each human being ‘as a human being’. Another element,
which needs to be highlighted, in the context of the present case, is that
human dignity is infringed if a person’s life, physical or mental welfare is
alarmed. It is in this sense of torture, humiliation, forced labour, etc. all
infringe on human dignity. It is in this context many rights of the accused
derive from his dignity as a human being”
In M Nagaraj v. Union of India,
it was held that dignity to be intrinsic and inseparable from human existence.
Dignity, the Court held, is not something which is conferred and which can be
taken away because it is inalienable:
“The rights, liberties and freedoms of the individual are not only to be
protected against the State, but they should also be facilitated by it… It is
the duty of the State not only to protect human dignity but to facilitate it by
taking positive steps in that direction. No exact definition of human dignity
exists. It refers to the intrinsic value of every human being, which is to be
respected. It cannot be taken away. It cannot give. It simply is. Every human
being has dignity by virtue of his existence…”
By denying the LGBTQ community an important aspect of their reality and
existence perpetuated by a penalizing provision is a direct attack at their
dignity which not only results in the community ostracizing such individuals
and prosecuting them simply for their choices, denying the liberty to make
choices just because a section of our society isn’t ready to accept a new
paradigm change in relationships. Needless to say that the same is a scathing
attack on the quality of life enjoyed by such individuals. Moreover, when a
three-judge bench of this Hon’ble court decided to look into the
constitutionality of section 377 despite the Suresh Kaushal
judgment is itself descriptive of the fact that there is indeed an issue which
needs to be adjudicated at the earliest as the stakes involve the very
veracity of the constitutional provisions inserted by our founding fathers with
the premise that the same would serve as a protection against the excesses of
the state and enable citizens to live their lives a manner they deem fit.
THE 2018 JUDGEMENT OF NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR CASE
Navtej Singh Johar case is pathbreaking in its approach as it sets
significant standards in jurisprudence, clarifies certain provisions and
strengthens some of the pillars of our democracy.
On 6th September 2018, a five-judge bench i.e. Hon’ble Chief Justice Dipak
Misra, Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Hon’ble Dr. Justice D.Y.
Chandrachud, Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.
F. Nariman and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Indu Malhotra of the Supreme Court
pronounced judgment over the issue i.e. ‘constitutional validity of section
377’ in Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India
. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that penalising consensual homosexual activities
is against the fundamental rights of a person and hence, is inconsistent with
the Constitution of India. Therefore, the Apex Court decriminalised homosexual
activities done with the consent of both the parties. Also, in the judgement,
the Court concerned with the following aspects:-
1. Constitutional Morality
The purpose of the Constitution of India is to transform society, not to
preserve the pre-existing values of the majority because the majority may be
heterosexuals who prefers the sexual intercourse only between the
opposite gender i.e., male and female that would be ‘social morality’ but to
transform society, it is the ‘constitutional morality’ which must prevail.
2. The miniscule Minority
Due to a “minuscule fraction of the country population” that belonged to
LGBTQ Community, the Apex Court has previously upheld section 377 of the IPC in
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation. Since the fundamentals rights are
available to every person irrespective of their sexual orientation, it was said
by Chief Justice Misra in Johar Case, that it is meaningless as how much the
number of people asserting a fundamental right.
The purpose of section 377 of IPC is to protect woman and children from
being subjected to carnal intercourse did not bear a reasonable nexus with the
classification of persons into those who have carnal intercourse against the
order of nature and those who don’t. In this, it was held that where there is
discrimination by the legislation on the ground of core trait of an individual
person then it cannot be termed under the reasonable classification that is
based on intelligible differential.
4. Manifest Arbitrariness
It was found by all the judges that section 377 was manifestly arbitrary
as even after the 2013 amendment to the IPC, it was only concerned with the
sexual acts between heterosexuals. Further, this section does not distinguish
sexual intercourse between consenting and non-consenting competent adults which
imposes a stigma on the members of
LGBTQ Community as procreation is not the sole aim in sexual intercourse and
the section itself discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.
Interpretation of the Constitution
The Apex Court held in furtherance on the principle of progressive
interpretation that the Constitution of India is a living and organic document
which is capable of expansion with the change in needs, culture and the beliefs
of the society, and hence, it is the duty of the courts to make
progressive and pragmatic interpretation of the law in order to ensure equality
and justice in the society. Furthermore, the court was also of the opinion that
the rule of courts increases when there is a case of rights of minorities in
order to ensure the supremacy of law.
Submissions of the Petitioner
1. In Navtej Johar case, it was submitted by the petitioners that
being a homosexual, bisexual or having other sexual orientation is completely
natural and reflective of the expression of choice and inclination on the
consent of two persons.
2. It was contended that sexual orientation of every member of the
LGBTQ Community is not a physical or mental illness but a natural variation of
3. It was urged that attraction towards the same sex or opposite sex
are both naturally same and normal but the difference is of the lesser ratio of
4. Homosexuals require more protection than the heterosexuals for the
purpose to achieve their full potential and to live freely without any fear or
apprehension likewise a recognition of ‘Protection of Woman from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005’.
5. Moreover, it was submitted that the rights of the LGBTQ Community
needs to be recognized and protected and sexual orientation is to be treated as
an integral part of every individual’s identity.
6. It was contended that the section 377 IPC is based on a foreign
ideology which denotes societal values of the Victorian era.
7. Further, it was contended that the Apex Court should protect
constitutional morality over social morality.
8. It was also contended that it is not yet defined the expression
“carnal intercourse” and hence, it is being used arbitrarily and making the
object of this provision inconsistent with the basic fundamentals of the
9. It was submitted that ‘sex’, under article 15 of the Constitution
includes ‘sexual orientation’ as observed in the case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy
(Retd.) v. Union Of India.
Further, a person can be prosecuted under section 376(c) to 376(e) for the
sexual acts done with an opposite gender without their consent whereas, the
same acts are penalized u/s 377 if done with a partner of the same gender.
10. Moreover, it was contended by the petitioners that the 172nd Law
recommends deleting section 377 IPC.
11. The petitioners submitted that the right to life and liberty of a
citizen is a fundamental right under article 21 of the Constitution, as
observed by the Apex Court in Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P
and Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh
which are arbitrarily curbed by section 377 IPC.
12. Furthermore, the Apex Court also held that the reputation is
protected by the constitution as it is individual’s personal security under the
right to enjoyment of life and liberty.
13. Lastly, it was contended that the LGBTQ+ community is deprived of
its basic rights such as health education, public recognition because of
constant terror in their minds due to the presence of this provision.
Submission of the Respondents
1. It was
submitted by the respondents that it would be violative of the principle of
natural justice if no opportunity is given to Union of India where it is
allowing any issue other than the constitutional validity of section 377 IPC.
It was further submitted by the respondents that various provisions of the
Constitution granted reliefs to the said community with issues pertaining to
gender identity and sexual orientation.
It was also contended that any other relief cannot be granted to them and such
prayers are abusive of privacy and personal liberty by transgressing the idea
of public morality and dignity.
The respondents contended that in homosexuals, the percentage of prevalence of
AIDS is much more than heterosexuals and thus, right to privacy may not be
extended in order to enable people to indulge in unnatural offences and thereby
It was further contended that if section 377 IPC is declared unconstitutional,
then the bulwark of social culture that is the family system will be in a
Furthermore, it was contended by the petitioners’ argument that, “the status of
homosexuals has changed in various parts of other countries”. This contention
must not be considered since the cultural, economic and political heritage of
those countries is quite different from that of India.
The respondents also contended that section 377 IPC is also applied to forced
penal, non-vaginal sexual intercourse between adults so if it is struck down,
then it would render the victims complaining of forced acts under such
It was also submitted that if same-sex adults are excluded from section 377 IPC
then it would make a married woman remediless under IPC against her bisexual
husband and his consenting male partner.
Moreover, it was submitted that in Fazal Rab Choudhary v State of Bihar,
it was held that the offences under section 377 IPC imply sexual perversity.
Furthermore, this Hon’ble Court also held that there should not be identical
transplantation of western ideologies into our country in the case of Jagmohan
v. State of U.P
respondents also contended that the word ‘sexual orientation’ is alien to the
Constitution of India, hence, if the word ‘sex’ is to be replaced with the word
‘sexual orientation’ under article 15, or a new term i.e. ‘sexual orientation’
is to be inserted under article 15, is a matter of Constitutional Amendment,
which is the responsibility of the Legislature. Hence, Section 377 should not
be considered to be in violation of Article 15 of the Constitution of India.
11. It was
further contended that penetration into non-sexual parts of the body under the
concept of against the order of nature does not discriminate as it is based on
biological reality which can never be unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the respondent relied on the Apex Court’s decision in the Suresh
Kumar Kaushal case,
in which there is a presumption of the constitutionality of legislation and the
court must adopt self-restraint and thereby refrain from giving birth to
legislation and the legislative wisdom of the Parliament must be respected
and it must be left to the Parliament to amend Section 377 IPC. Furthermore, in
the case of Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal
the court was of the opinion that it should not re-write, recast or reframe the
legislation for any good reason to which it has no power to legislate,
and therefore, the courts cannot add words to a statute or read words into it
which are not there.
Critical Analysis of the Judgment
1. In the judgment, the ratio to the decision given by Justice R. F.
Nariman, he quotes “The love that dare not speak its name” which describes that
how the love exists between same-sex couples which were described by Lord
Alfred Douglas, the lover of Oscar Wilde, in his poem two love, published in
1894 in Victorian England” but the same statement can fit duly in context to
the cases of adultery or extramarital affairs, which is penalised under the
law. Furthermore, in both these situations, both the offenders duly have the
consent to the same but this does not make their act legitimate in the eyes of
law. So, how does love between homosexuals make any difference? Furthermore, it
is expected from the Hon’ble Court to keep aside the personal views and
emotions and to interpret the law in its true sense.
2. In the above judgment, two cases were cited: National Legal
Services Authority v. UOI
– in which it was construed that gender identity and sexual orientation of an
individual are an integral part of article 15 and 21 of the Constitution of
India. Moreover, the court also referred to the case of Justice K. S. Puttaswamy
(Retd.) v. Union of India
in which, the right to privacy was given a fundamental status under the ambit
of Article 21 which enured in favour of all persons, as well as the right to
make individual choices was found to be an integral part of a person’s way of
living in which the state is ought not to interfere.
In context with the abovementioned cases, the term sexual orientation is an
alien term and is nowhere mentioned under article 15 of the Constitution of
India and if the Apex Court deems it fine to insert the same under the
ambit of article 15 of the Constitution, then the court must recommend the same
to the legislature, since the
Constitution has vested the power of amendments to the legislature and not
to the Judiciary. The same was also duly contended by the respondents. It is
further contended that the ambit, scope and limitations to the right to
privacy, as mentioned in the case of Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union Of
India is yet to be determined. Since the
right to privacy is not an absolute right, sexual activities within the same
sex must not be treated in the light of the right to privacy.
3. The status of homosexuality in different countries and views
presented by different foreign courts form a part of the ratio of the
judgement, however, the adoption of certain policies and theories in some
foreign land must not be the sole purpose to determine the validity of certain
legislation within the country. Moreover, the court also considered the 172nd
Law Commission report which talks about deleting Section 377 IPC, it is to be
noted that the 172nd Law Commission report, though, is of the belief of
deleting section 377 IPC, it does not present the view of decriminalising
same-gender Sex. Rather, it suggests serving each and every offense which is
covered under the ambit of section 377 to be dealt with indigenous provisions.
4. Justice Nariman, in ratio to his judgment, states that in the
context of India, fundamental right to privacy would include at least the
following three aspects:
o “Privacy that involves the person i.e. when there is some
invasion by the state, of a person’s rights related to his physical body.
o Informational Privacy that does not deal with a person’s body,
but rather a person’s mind.
o The privacy of choice, which protects an individual’s autonomy
over fundamental personal choices”
In light of the interpretation of privacy made by the Hon’ble justice
Nariman, if all three principles are read together, it gives complete immunity
to a citizen under the right to privacy. No limitations have been discussed by
Justice Nariman, and if the interpretation of the right to privacy is done in
the same way as interpreted by Justice Nariman, then, in that situation each
and every law would stand to be an inconsistency with the Article 21 of the
Constitution. Hence, it must be admitted that such interpretation of the right
to privacy is incomplete and does not match the objective sought to be achieved
under article 21 of the constitution of India.
5. The Hon’ble Court also highlights the principle of “right to
self-determination and individual autonomy”. In this regard, Justice
Chandrachud gives ration over this principle and is of the opinion that human
dignity is intrinsic to preserving the sanctity of life. He believes that “life
is truly sanctified when it is lived with dignity” he further states that,
“there should be no antagonism between the sanctity of human life and its
dignity as well as quality. The quality of life ensures the dignity of living
and dignity is a bit a process in realizing the sanctity of life”. The same is
true and acceptable but the principle of self-determination cannot be relied
upon since a person may change his sanctity again and again over a period of
time, in the absence of the actual procedure of self-determination, and such
principle, without the presence of a codified procedure, can be used
arbitrarily. Hence, this principle cannot be relied upon, until complete
guidelines are given by the Legislature over this principle.
After a long decade of time when the rights of LGBTQ+ community has given
due consideration after 158 years of implementation of IPC and in furtherance
of the same, the judgment of Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India
was passed as on 6th September 2018, decriminalizing section 377 of the IPC.
But apart from that, there are other perspectives like the laws relating to
such community are not yet defined providing a hindrance to their life. Also,
there is no proper awareness regarding homosexuality in society. Further, the
legislation must pass an amendment to section 377, making it clear, and
removing any sort of ambiguity to such provision. Also, the legislature must pass
special legislation, which would deal in rights, duties and remedies available
to the LGBTQ+ community. Therefore, the verdict has turned out to be an
effective step towards securing the rights of LGBTQ+ community but requires a
social change too in the society.
 Section-377, Indian Penal Code, 1860.
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29; Malhotra J, paragraph 14.9 in Navtej
Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India
 Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755
 (2017) 10 SCC 1
( 2013) 2 SCC 398
( 2013) 10 SCC 591
 (1982) 3 SCC 9
 (1973) 1 SCC 20
 Suresh Kumar Kaushal v Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1
 (1992) SUPP (1) SCC 323
 (2014) 5 SCC 438
 (2017) 10 SCC 1
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Acronyms, Initialisms & Abbreviations Dictionary, Volume 1, Part 1. Gale
Research Co., 1985, ISSN 978-0-8103-0683-7. Factsheet five, Issues 32-36, Mike
Indian Penal code, 1860
Writ Petition (Civil) No 494 of 2012
 Section-377, Indian Penal Code, 1860
Sexual offences act,1967
Article 14, Constitution of India
1964 SCR (1) 332
SCR (2) 557
1978) 1 SCC 248
(2015) 6 SCC 702
Writ Petition (civil) 61 of 2002
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10972 OF 2013
Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India WP(Crl.)No.76/2016
Malhotra J, paragraph
14.3, Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v.
Union of India
CJ, paragraph 239; Nariman J, paragraph 82; Chandrachud J, paragraph 29;
Malhotra J, paragraph 14.9 in Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of
Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755
2017) 10 SCC 1
(2013) 2 SCC 398
2013) 10 SCC 591
(1982) 3 SCC 9
1973) 1 SCC 20
Suresh Kumar Kaushal v Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1
(1992) SUPP (1) SCC 323
(2014) 5 SCC 438
(2017) 10 SCC 1